English This essay applies the methods of philosophical psychology to develop a perspective for the
investigation of »religious emotions« within the field of religious studies. The principal idea
underlying the sketched perspective is that emotions can be viewed as actions, or as ways of
seeing the world. Emotions are not reactions but judgements and positions, projections and
interpretations. This conception of emotions is introduced in terms of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s
remarks on philosophical psychology, Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of the emotions and Robert C.
Solomon’s cognitive theory, which maintains that emotions are our own judgements, »with
which we ‘constitute’ not only our world but ourselves«. These theories are subsequently considered
in relation to the concept of religious emotions by means of a discussion of Richard
Steele’s succinct formulation of the connection between language, narratives and emotions:
»Human emotions are shaped by the communities to which we belong and by the authoritative
narratives and distinctive practices of those communities«. The implications of the
sketched perspective are finally summed up in six theses on religious emotions.